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Abstract
This article argues that on the borderland between eastern DRC and Rwanda, the past
and its representations have been constantly manipulated. The cataclysmic events in
both Rwanda and Congo since the 1990s have widened the gap between partial and poli-
ticized historical discourse and careful historical analysis. The failure to pay attention to the
multiple layers in the production of historical narratives risks reproducing a politicized
social present that ‘naturalizes’ differences and antagonisms between different groups
by giving them more time-depth. This is a danger both for insiders and outsiders looking
in. The answer is to focus on the historical trajectories that shape historical narratives, and
to ‘bring history back in’.
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In the introduction to an acclaimed article on the silences and misunderstandings of
Rwandan historiography, Catharine and David Newbury argue that to understand the
cataclysmic event of the genocide in Rwanda in , one should not look at the past
through the lens of the genocide, as is often done, but rather analyze the genocide through
an understanding of Rwanda’s history. Unfortunately, although there is excellent research
from eminent scholars with long careers in the region who all have placed the genocide and
violence of  in a longer historical perspective, actual historical research based on pri-
mary sources on the period before the genocide has become increasingly scarce since
. While most contemporary studies do refer to this more historical literature, for
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many younger scholars, the history of Rwanda starts in . If the colonial period is dis-
cussed, it is most often to address the debate on how ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ became distinct
groups. Within Rwanda, history is a subject fraught with tension, and the internal histori-
ography of Rwanda is closely scrutinized by the Rwandan government.
Similar tendencies can be observed in the eastern Congo. The historiography of the east-
ern Congo was relatively rich in the years before the wars of the s, and excellent work
was produced by Congolese historians. Today, however, researchers (both insiders and
outsiders) predominantly focus on contemporary issues, or on events since the s.
In many – but not all – cases this leads to history being used as a backdrop in the introduc-
tion, rather than an analysis of how historical processes continue to have an impact today.
This article argues that scholars and analysts should pay more attention to the way the
past is connected to the present within Rwanda and eastern Congo – not only because not
doing so can lead to the ‘foreshortening of history’, to borrow a term from Richard Reid,
but also because we cannot understand the processes propelling violence fully if we study
them within a limited timeframe. While longer timeframes have been adopted with
regards to some of the historical narratives that propped up ethnic violence in the region –
for example on the Hamitic hypothesis – this article shows the intertwining of past and
present goes far beyond these topics.
It is not a new insight to suggest that representations of the past are often informed by a
certain form of presentism, and that they reﬂect contemporary needs and concerns rather
than the past they are supposed to represent. Yet it is relevant to analyse what this means
in a context where historical narratives are regularly used to exclude certain groups of peo-
ple, and where memory and history have often been forged in the context of traumatic
events or violent conﬂict. In contexts such as Rwanda, where strictly deﬁned historical nar-
ratives are a way of dealing with a gruesome past, and renderings of the past have become
an important part of the ideological underpinnings of the regime, ‘memory’ and ‘history’
have become a battleground on which state-sanctioned historical narratives and memories
clash with ‘counter-memories’.
 Personal conversation with a younger Rwanda scholar.
 S. W. Freedman et al., ‘Teaching history after identity-based conﬂicts: the Rwanda experience’, Comparative
Education Review, : (), –; E. King, From Classrooms to Conﬂict (Cambridge, ).
 D. Newbury, ‘Bushi and the historians: historiographical themes in Eastern Kivu’, History in Africa,  (),
–; B. Chubaka and D. Newbury, ‘Recent historical research in the area of Lake Kivu: Rwanda and
Zaire’, History in Africa,  (), –. Congolese historians before the wars: Bucyalimwe Mararo,
A. Njangu Canda-Ciri, Bishikwabo Chubaka, Birhakaheka Njiga, J. Nzabandora Ndimubanzi, Rukatsi
Hakiza, Bin Mubibi Mugaruka, etc. For exceptions today, see the work of K. Hoffman, N. Eggers,
A. Tegera, and V. Van Bockhaven. Scholars working on Katanga are not included here.
 R. Reid, ‘Past and presentism: the “precolonial” and the foreshortening of African history’, The Journal of
African History, : (), –.
 N. Eltringham, ‘“Invaders who have stolen the country”: the Hamitic hypothesis, race and the Rwandan
genocide’, Social Identities, : (), –; S. Jackson, ‘Regional conﬂict and the “Bantu/Nilotic”
mythology in the Great Lakes’, Centre on International Cooperation Report (New York, ).
 J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (Oxford, ).
 J. Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conﬂict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century
(Cambridge, ); F. Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining a reluctant post-genocide society: the Rwandan patriotic
front’s ideology and practice’, Journal of Genocide Research, : (): –; C. Newbury, ‘Ethnicity
and the politics of history in Rwanda’, Africa Today, : (), –.
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This discursive battle impacts on the kind of histories that can be written about the
region. The politicized nature of historical narratives, and the profound infusion of
present-day concerns into historical narratives make the use of oral history difﬁcult.
This is not only a concern for ‘professional’ academics, but also for international inter-
veners and local practitioners who frequently include historical information on local
communities in reports and recommendations. Often these ‘histories’ are based on
scanty documentation and on interviews and focus groups, whose information is
taken at face value, thus reproducing a politicized social present. This article claims
that the solution is more, rather than less, historical research, and that research in gen-
eral needs to pay more attention to the historical construction not only of identities, but
also of territories.
This article, then, seeks to unravel how the multiple layers of history, memory, and
recurring waves of violence became condensed into (ethnicized) mental maps guiding inter-
pretations of both the past and the social present, not only among Congolese, but also
among outsiders looking in. The focus is on the relationship between ‘mythico-histories’
pertaining to territory, belonging, and territorial expansion, and their role in the construc-
tion of ‘autochthony’ and ‘victimhood’ (for Congo) and for state-building processes (for
Rwanda).
While discourse in itself is not sufﬁcient to explain violence, the forms and intensity of
violence are deeply affected by the discourse – the mental maps – of the actors. Violence
cannot be understood without understanding the discursive concepts that justify it for
the actors. In Kivu, such discourses, based on slippery ethnic categories, are particularly
pronounced – and directly associated with violence.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
Before the Rwandan genocide in , violent conﬂicts in North and South Kivu between
different groups remained limited mainly to the local level. It is only with the arrival of
Rwandan Hutu refugees in Congo that local conﬂicts took on regional dimensions.
From  the area witnessed ﬁve episodes of acutely destructive and disruptive violence
associated directly or indirectly with external Rwandan support. The ﬁrst was a direct
incursion as Rwanda sought to close the refugee camps that harboured over one million
exiles who had ﬂed the country in the aftermath of the genocide in . From late
October  Rwandan troops invaded Congo and attacked the refugee camps. Their sta-
ted targets were Interahamwe militia and politicians responsible for the planning and exe-
cution of the genocide, who had started to launch attacks on Rwanda from the camps in
 On mythico-histories, see L. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among
Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago, ).
 R. Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (London, ); J. Verweijen, ‘From
autochthony to violence? Discursive and coercive social practices of the Mai-Mai in Fizi, eastern DR
Congo’, African Studies Review, : (), . However, the presence of certain discourses is not
enough. Strauss argues concerning hate media in Rwanda that radio emissions alone cannot explain the
onset of genocidal violence; see S. Strauss, ‘What is the relationship between hate radio and violence?
Rethinking Rwanda’s “radio machete”’, Politics and Society, : (), –.
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Congo. However, among these Rwandan refugees were also many innocent men, women,
and children, who were forced to ﬂee further into Congo and/or killed during these attacks.
In addition to the Rwandan refugees, millions of Congolese were also affected by this inva-
sion – driven from their homes, humiliated in a number of ways, and many killed.
In early , the Rwandan government helped consolidate several Congolese groups
opposed to Mobutu into one ﬁghting organization, forming the Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Zaire (AFDL), in the guise of a ‘local rebellion’.
After a long march across Congo, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) – the army of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the dominant force in the post-genocide Rwandan govern-
ment – and their Congolese allies overthrew Mobutu in May . This episode became
known as the First Congo War.
A year later, partly responding to the intense hatred within Congo towards the
Rwandans, Kabila tried to expel the latter, provoking a third Rwandan incursion from
August . This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War, at one point involving
no less than nine African countries. Part of that invasion included the establishment of
another ‘cover-group’, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and,
later still, the Congrès National pour la Défense des Peuples (CNDP) and the
Mouvement du  Mars (M). While each of these groups nurtured their own local grie-
vances, they were also armed and/or supported in different degrees by the government of
Rwanda. Consequently, they were seen in Congo as proxies for Rwandan incursion – and
as a cover for the extraction of mineral and other resources that followed.
As a result, the discourses of violence in Congo became deeply ethnicized. The com-
plication was that the several groups of Kinyarwanda-speakers long resident within
Congo – often divided, even antagonistic, among themselves – were seen by many
Congolese as Rwandan ﬁfth columns. For many Congolese, the cultural identity of
Kinyarwanda-speakers became to be seen exclusively through a political lens, and
hence these groups were perceived as inevitably afﬁliated with the Kigali regime. In
response to the multiple external incursions against Congo from the east, the ethnic criteria
of violence thus also became directed against all Congolese Kinyarwanda-speakers – some of
whom had lived for centuries west of the Virunga Mountains and Lake Kivu (the current
political boundary) and had never been included within the political domain of the
Rwandan central court or the Rwandan colonial administration.
AUTOCHTHONY AND MYTHICO-HISTORIES
The Kivu region of the eastern Congo has been home for centuries to dozens of groups
deﬁned as ‘ethnic’. Some of these speak Kinyarwanda (the language spoken in Rwanda),
 On these wars, see R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Pennsylvania, );
F. Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, – (Cambridge, );
J. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of Congo and the Great War of Africa
(New York, ); T. Turner, The Congo Wars: Conﬂict, Myth and Reality (London, ). For CNDP
and M, see Stearns, From CNDP to M: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo
(London, ).
 vol .  , no .  BR ING ING HI STORY BACK IN
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853717000391
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Newcastle Library, on 24 Oct 2017 at 09:46:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
hence are referred to as ‘Rwandophones’ or ‘Kinyarwanda-speakers’. They share variants
of a common broader language unit with Rwandophones elsewhere in the region. Today
this language group includes members who identify as (or are identiﬁed as) Hutu, Tutsi, or
Twa. The existence of a group across the current border also speaking Kinyarwanda is one
of the reasons why this group is often labelled as ‘non-autochthonous’ by other Congolese.
In a move to stress their autochthony, and to emphasize the difference with ‘Rwanda’,
Congolese Kinyarwanda-speaking communities use toponyms to refer to their community,
such as Banyabwisha, Banyamasisi, Banyamulenge, etc.
The idea of ‘autochthony’ refers to a presupposed ‘natural’ relationship between ‘people’
and the ‘soil’, and thus implies claims to territory. In Africa, it is often directly related to
ideas about national citizenship. In Kivu, discourses on ‘autochthony’ are crucial to
understanding modes of mobilization that include or exclude people from certain rights
or access to certain resources. There, ‘proving’ autochthonous status is often pivotal to peo-
ple’s livelihoods, and has implications for getting access to land, or ﬁnding a job. Being
considered as autochthonous has in the past also been important to claim legal citizenship.
During moments of increased tension, being considered non-autochthonous can lead, and
has led, to persecution and violence.
Autochthony discourses are highly elastic, are ill-deﬁned, and are often superﬁcial.
Shifting from one ‘other’ to the next is possible, without these autochthony discourses los-
ing credibility or impact. The malleability of autochthonous categories points to the vola-
tility of these discourses delineating who is in and who is out. Hutu are thus sometimes
included, and at other times excluded as part of the ‘autochthonous’ population of Kivu
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in general. Moreover, Kinyarwanda-
speakers themselves are also internally divided. Many Hutu in Goma, for example, con-
sider themselves as ‘more autochthonous’ than Tutsi. Because of the volatility of these
autochthony discourses, they are very easily manipulated and mobilized. Often auto-
chthony discourses are embedded in wider discourses about identity in the Great Lakes
region, such as the Hamitic hypothesis. This hypothesis, a colonial construct that
 The term Kinyarwanda-speaker is elusive. Many who would be targeted in these discourses do not have
Kinyarwanda as a mother tongue – nor is the ability to speak Kinyarwanda limited to those contained in
this group.
 On the genesis of the term Banyamulenge, see R. Lemarchand, ‘Exclusion, marginalization, and political
mobilization: the road to hell in the Great Lakes’, Centre of African Studies Occasional Paper ().
 P. Geschiere and S. Jackson, ‘Autochthony and the crisis of citizenship: democratization, decentralization, and
the politics of belonging’, African Studies Review, : (), –.
 K. Büscher, ‘Conﬂict, state failure and urban transformation in the Eastern Congolese periphery: the case of
Goma’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Ghent University, ), .
 B. Ceuppens and P. Geschiere, ‘Autochthony: local or global? New modes in the struggle over citizenship and
belonging in Africa and Europe’, Annual Review of Anthropology,  (), .
 S. Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil? The language and politics of autochthony in Eastern DR Congo’, African
Studies Review, : (), .
 Büscher, ‘Conﬂict’, .
 J.-F. Bayart, P. Geschiere, and F. Nyamnjoh, ‘Autochtonie, démocratie et citoyenneté en Afrique’, Critique
Internationale,  (), –.
 Chrétien provides a good overview of archaeological and linguistic evidence for both the Hamitic hypothesis
and the Bantu expansion; see J.-P. Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History
(New York, ), –.
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presupposed a hierarchy in African races, held that Tutsi origins lay outside of the Great
Lakes region. While this discourse played an important role during the genocide in
Rwanda, it also recurs in autochthony discourses in the DRC.
According to Bayart et al., claims to ‘autochthony’ are not only characterized by their
‘slipperiness’, but also by their strong emotional appeal and their dubious historical
basis. The Hamitic hypothesis is an example of a discourse with a strong emotional
appeal but without much historical validity. It could be considered as a ‘mythico-history’,
a term coined by Liisa Malkki when conducting research among Hutu refugees in
Tanzania. These refugees’ renderings of the past:
went far beyond merely recording events. It represented, not only a description of the past, nor
even merely an evaluation of the past, but a subversive recasting of it in fundamentally moral
terms. In this sense, it cannot be accurately described as either history or myth. It was what can
be called a mythico-history. . . . [T]he refugees’ historical narratives comprised a set of moral
and cosmological ordering stories: stories which classify the world according to certain principles,
thereby simultaneously creating it.
Therefore, the notion of ‘mythico-histories’ is not only useful in understanding how these
autochthony discourses are constructed, but also in understanding the nature of historical
narratives in the region in general. We will now deal with the mythico-history of a ‘greater
Rwanda’, focusing on how mythico-histories connect past and present, and how they relate
to discourses on conﬂict and territory.
THE ‘GREATER RWANDA’: A MYTHICO-HISTORY IN AND ABOUT
RWANDA
Focusing on the mythico-history of ‘a greater Rwanda’ shows that it not only bolstered
Rwanda’s meddling in the eastern DRC, but also that it is important to contemporary
state-building processes within Rwanda. The idea of a ‘Greater Rwanda’ is based on
two related premises: () by imposing borders, the Europeans divided one presupposed
homogenous group (the Banyarwanda) that existed before the imposition of the borders;
and () through the imposition of these artiﬁcial borders, a large part of the territory
that it had acquired through conquest was amputated from the precolonial Rwandan
kingdom.
The ﬁrst premise confounds the cultural continuum of Kinyarwanda-speaking people,
sharing cultural traits, with the existence of a political realm that incorporated these
Kinyarwanda-speaking people; the second premise equates conquest or presence at a cer-
tain time with long-lasting occupation and rights to territory. Apart from the political
and ideological dimensions of this idea of a ‘greater Rwanda’ the historical record does
not support this mythico-history. If anything, one could easily argue that Rwanda was
 Eltringham, ‘Invaders’; Jackson, ‘Regional’.
 J.-F. Bayart et al., ‘Autochtonie’, –.
 Malkki, Purity, .
 For an unravelling of this second premise, see D. Newbury, ‘Irredentist Rwanda: ethnic and territorial frontiers
in Central Africa’, Africa Today, : (), –.
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smaller, and not larger at the end of the nineteenth century (especially after the demise of
mwami (king) Rwabugiri in ), or at least that not all regions nowadays included
within Rwanda were under control of the centre at that time.
It is necessary to scrutinize the genesis of the idea about the alleged amputation of
Rwandan territory. It often comes up in daily speech in Rwanda and it is actively propa-
gated in Rwandan state-sponsored media such as the New Times:
Berlin Germany, –. Rwandans may never know what was discussed in the Berlin
Conference. . . . But they know that, whatever the method of decision, at the end of it they came
out the ‘tinier’ for it. From a vast country that covered swathes of eastern Congo, southern
Uganda and north-western Tanganyika, Rwanda became the tiny hill of Central Africa. There
is no doubt that having a strong, centrally-organized administration had something to do with
it. No one wants a strong, bothersome inﬂuence near when they set out to ‘civilize’ a region.
More importantly perhaps is the impact it has on perceptions of the involvement of
Rwanda in the conﬂicts in Kivu and the potentiality of these discourses for aggravating ten-
sions towards the Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the DRC.
The most telling example of these Rwandan claims was made on  October .
Pasteur Bizimungu (then president) gathered an international audience in the middle of
the ﬁrst RPA attacks on Congo (then Zaïre), and just before the RPA launched the ﬁrst
attacks on the Hutu refugee camps in North and South Kivu. He discussed the bound-
aries of the precolonial Rwandan kingdom and claimed that Rwanda had been ‘dismem-
bered’ by the colonial borders. Although he did not state it explicitly, the claim that
without the imposition of colonial rule, large parts of the eastern Congo would have
been Rwandan anyway seems to have been a way to legitimize the initial stages of
Rwanda’s involvement in Congo and the meddling that was to come. Bizimungu sup-
ported his claims with maps of precolonial Rwanda, based on Alexis Kagame’s work,
showing that the borders of Rwanda’s precolonial kingdom stretched far into the eastern
DRC, as far as Lake Edward.
 J. Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison, WI, ), ; Newbury,
‘Irredentist’; G. Mathys, ‘People on the move: frontiers, borders, mobility and history in the Lake Kivu
region nineteenth–twentieth century’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Ghent University, ).
 Both in interviews and during informal conversations I had in Rwanda between  and .
 P. Butamire, ‘While the DRC burns, the West plays roulette’, The New Times (Rwanda),  June .
References in daily speech, and this article were produced in the context of a discussion of the ‘crisis’ in
Congo that was a result of the war with M (see below), (http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?
i=&a=). A more recent example is E. Kabanda, ‘The next rebel leader in eastern Congo will
be less astute and more brutal’, The East African,  Dec. , (http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/
Next-rebel-leader-in-eastern-Congo-less-astute-and-more-brutal/--item--nfvwz/index.html).
The East African is a Kenyan-based newspaper, but Emma Kabanda is based in Kigali and used to write for
the New Times.
 Newbury, ‘Irredentist’, .
 Ibid. n.
 At the end of October and beginning of November : Reyntjens, Great, .
 Newbury, ‘Irredentist’; Lemarchand, Dynamics, .
 Lemarchand, Dynamics; J.-C. Willame, ‘Banyarwanda et Banyamulenge: violences ethniques et gestion de
l’identitaire au Kivu’, Cahiers Africains,  (), .
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Catholic priest and historian Alexis Kagame was born in to a family of biru, ofﬁcial ideo-
logues appointed by the royal court of Rwanda to preserve traditions, which heavily
inﬂuenced his historical outlook. His visions of the expansion of Rwanda were ideo-
logical projections propping the court’s political and territorial claims rather than (always)
describing actual historical realities. As Catharine and David Newbury have argued,
ofﬁcial royal court histories and royal Rwandan history both have a powerful ‘irredentist
streak’.
Kagame projected an image of a uniﬁed Rwanda long before it showed centralizing ten-
dencies and confused temporary conquests and evanescent occupation (which did take
place) with actual and long-lasting annexation (which did not always take place). That
this vision about a ‘Greater Rwanda’ as propagated by Kagame was a court-sanctioned
vision can be illustrated by mwami Musinga’s (–) discourse in a letter written
to the Germans in which he promised his support during the First World War.
[D]o you think . . . that I love the Belgians so much more than you, or the British more than the
Germans? Look, the Belgians came to Ishangi and killed several Banyarwanda and took their cat-
tle, they took part of my territory, notably Bwisha, Gisigari, Bunyungu, Kameronse [today in
DRC] and Bugoyi. That has been taken from me, and the possessions I had there, and they also
have taken away other parts of territory that I do not remember anymore, they prohibited the
population of these places to bring me anything. . . . If you ﬁght against them [the Belgians], it
is in my interest.
It seems that the trickling down of this idea into the rank-and-ﬁle of Rwandan society is
something that occurred later, and that even people associated with the monarchy did
not always adhere to this vision of the past. Even for mwami Rwabugiri’s reign (–
), the heyday of precolonial Rwandan expansion, the idea of actual territorial gain out-
side of the current Rwandan borders is contested. Rwabugiri’s reign was marked by mul-
tiple military campaigns against regions in what is now the eastern Congo and he managed
to occupy some of these regions for a limited period.
However, this temporary occupation never led to full integration into the Rwandan
kingdom. Narrators in the Ibitéekerezo, a body of historical narratives collected between
 and , refute the idea that Rwabugiri’s conquests led to the actual expansion of
the Rwandan kingdom. One narrator, Nganguure, claimed: ‘All the foreign countries
that Rwabugiri had conquered, they all reconstituted themselves. No stranger remained
in the country. They reconstituted themselves instantly.’ Birasenyeri, a lieutenant of
 Newbury and Newbury, ‘Bringing’, ; Vansina, Antecedents, –; C. Vidal, ‘Alexis Kagame entre mémoire
et histoire’, History in Africa,  (), –; C. Vidal, Sociologie Des Passions (Paris, ), –.
 Newbury and Newbury, ‘Bringing’, .
 African Archives Brussels (AAB), Ruanda-Urundi , Nyanza,  Sept. , Yuhi Musinga to Residentur.
Original in Kiswahili, cited in copy ‘Pour traduction conforme’, Usumbura,  Feb. .
 Newbury, ‘Irredentist’; Vansina, Antecedents; G. Mathys, ‘People’.
 J. Vansina, ‘Historical tales (Ibitéekerezo) and the history of Rwanda’, History in Africa,  (), –.
 Ibitéekerezo, Rwabugiri File, Ngaangure, T. no . The same sentiment is also expressed in Ibitéekerezo,
Rwabugiri File, T. no. .
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Rwabugiri involved in his military campaigns expressed a similar idea: ‘Of all the ﬂeeting
conquests in Bunyabungo [Bushi] and Idjwi only the memory remains.’
Most likely, the idea of ‘a greater Rwanda’ mobilized by those connected to the mon-
archy began its wider propagation with Alexis Kagame’s work. During Rwanda’s
Second Republic (–) it seems that Kagame’s work remained the main source for
the history of Rwanda. In the manuals for history education during this period, the idea
of le Rwanda ancien stretching into the actual territories of the DRC and Uganda was pre-
sent. Even Ferdinand Nahimana, staunch critic of Kagame’s version of the past on other
topics, seems to have accepted Kagame’s version of the geographical extent of the expan-
sion of Rwanda. He wrote:
The kingdom of Rwanda was constituted, before the colonial intrusion in a true state (véritable
entité étatique), with solid structures of government, which were exercised over a rather homoge-
neous population, especially because of the language, Kinyarwanda. Rwanda had known borders,
easily visible. Thus, towards the west, the kingdom encompassed the whole of Lake Kivu, islands
included. The colonial objectives of . . . Leopold II, interfered while the kingdom tried to annex,
successfully, the territory populated by Havu, Andani [sic] and Hunde . . . thus the whole region
situated to the west of Lake Kivu and the Rusizi river. Also in the west . . . the Rwandan kingdom
already had a stable border which ended in Lake Rwicanzige, the actual Lake Edward.
These ideas of a greater Rwanda have persisted to the present day. If anything, they have
become more closely related to the nation-building and reconciliation project that the RPF
has instigated. As Pottier and Reyntjens both point out, the (re)writing of the history of
Rwanda was (and still is) not a mere by-product of the RPF’s rule, but has been a priority
of the government and is an important ideological foundation of their regime.
The main claim of this ofﬁcially sanctioned history is that before colonialism ‘[a]ll
Rwandans were living together, and speaking the same language, they had the same culture
and were loving each other.’ This unity between the three groups constituting ‘Rwandans’was
ﬁrst eroded by German and Belgian colonial practices and later destroyed by Belgian coloni-
alism. This mythico-history – which denies regional differences, inter- and intra-ethnic
 Collection Derscheid, ‘Notes sur les faits et gestes de Rwabugiri au Kinyaga, d’après Birasenyeri témoin
oculaire et compagnon assidu du roi guerrier’, Par le RP Delmas des Pères Blancs, Nyamasheke,  Nov. .
 E. Mutabazi, ‘Les enjeux des nouvelles valeurs dans l’enseignement de l’histoire du Rwanda après le génocide’,
Actes du congrès de l’Actualité de la recherche en éducation et en formation (AREF), Université de Genève
(), .
 On the existence of ‘non-Nyiginya’ kingdoms, see especially F. Nahimana, Le Rwanda, émergence d’un Etat
(Paris, ), . Nahimana was co-founder of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) (see
below). Nahimana has been convicted by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) for his role in the genocide.
 F. Nahimana, ‘Les suites de la conférence de Berlin: L’exemple de la délimitation des frontières nord et
nord-ouest du Rwanda’, in C. Coquery-Vidrovitch Catherine (ed.), Autour de la conférence de Berlin
(Paris, ), p. . See also F. Nahimana, Le blanc est arrivé, le roi est parti: une facette de l’histoire du
Rwanda contemporain, – (Kigali, ), –.
 Pottier, Re-Imagining, –; Reyntjens, ‘(Re-)imagining’, –.
 See, Republic of Rwanda, Ofﬁce of the President of the Republic, Report on the reﬂection meeting held in the
ofﬁce of the president from May  to March , Kigali, Aug. , (https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/
bitstream/handle///.pdf?sequence=).
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ﬁghting and unequal political integration – also has consequences for the perception of
territory and borders. The idea of living together, sharing cultural traits and speaking the
same language echoes nineteenth-century discourses on the European nation-state.
Indeed, the idea of Rwanda as a precolonial nation-state has been picked up by histor-
ians in Rwanda, who have argued that a uniﬁed Rwandan nation of Kinyarwanda-
speakers already existed in the nineteenth century, even if the historical record reveals
that the situation was more complex. Frank Rusagara vented similar assertions in
Resilience of a Nation. He advocated for the campaign ndi umunyarwanda (‘I am
Rwandan’), which promotes the government’s version of ‘reconciliation’ and the idea of
‘Rwandanicity’, in Europe.
Likewise, during itorero trainings – a form of ‘civic education’ meant to instil
‘Rwandanicity’ in Rwandan subjects – one of the key messages about Rwanda’s presup-
posed precolonial golden age is that the territory of the precolonial kingdom was in per-
petual expansion, and surpassed its current borders. To emphasize the greatness of
ancient Rwanda, maps including parts of the DRC, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania
into Rwanda are sometimes shown to the itorero participants.
Although it is difﬁcult to assess their impact, political discourses have mobilized the his-
tory of the expansion of the Rwandan kingdom to legitimize military and political inter-
ventions in the DRC. Today this ‘mythico-histoy’ also buttresses and is related to
discourses about colonial wrongdoing that led to territorial losses – which is also very pre-
sent in explanations of how ‘Rwandans’ came to be divided – and an aspiration to a certain
grandeur that Rwanda has lost. The evolution of this idea of a ‘Greater Rwanda’ shows
that it is not new, but that it is being repackaged for different reasons.
This narrative of a ‘greater Rwanda’ has also been instrumentalized across the border in
the eastern Congo, albeit in a different fashion. There, it feeds into historical narratives
about expansionist tendencies of Rwandans in general and Tutsi in particular, and has
been turned into a lens through which more recent aggressions by Rwanda, or rebellions
with support from Rwanda, are being read. In turn, this framework is mobilized to
 C. Kalimba, ‘Le Rwanda: les frontières’, in D. Byanafashe (ed.), Les déﬁs de l’historiographie rwandaise, T:
les faits controversés (Butare, ); G. Mbonimana, ‘Le Rwanda, état-nation au ième siècle’, in Byanafashe
(ed.), Les déﬁs.
 F. Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation: A History of the Military in Rwanda (Kampala, ), , . Rusagara
is a former Brigadier General who was close to Kagame and who held several senior positions in the Rwandan
Defence Forces (RDF) before being arrested in  for alleged links with the opposition in exile.
 Special Correspondent the East African, ‘Former RDF boss Rusagara arrested over “link” to exiled
opposition’, The East African,  Aug. , (http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/Former-RDF-
boss-Rusagara-arrested-over-link-to-exiled-opposition/--laust/index.html). For a detailed
analysis of Rusagara’s ‘Rwandancity’, see D. Newbury, ‘Canonical conventions in Rwanda: four myths of
recent historiography in Central Africa’, History in Africa,  (),  and passim.
 M. Sundberg, Training for Model Citizenship: An Ethnography of Civic Education and State-Making in
Rwanda (New York, ), . For a thorough discussion and critique of itorero, see A. Purdekova, ‘Civic
education and social transformation in post-genocide Rwanda: forging the perfect development subjects’, in
M. Campioni (ed.), Rwanda Fast Forward. Social, Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects
(London, ), –.
 Lemarchand, Dynamics, .
 See Pan Butamire’s quote above.
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legitimize violence against Rwandophones or Congolese Tutsi who, in this vision, are
either seen as an extension of these Rwandan plans or considered as Rwandan tout court.
CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP AND THE COLONIAL TOOLBOX
Kinyarwanda-speakers in Congo are not a homogenous group. They have very different
backgrounds and arrived during different time periods in what is present-day Congo.
Most researchers distinguish four different groups:
() ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ who settled in Kivu long before the colonial period (for example,
the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, Hutu and Tutsi of Bwisha around Rutshuru, . . .).
() ‘Banyarwanda immigrants’ (or their descendants) who were settled in Kivu by the
colonial administration from  onwards to serve as a labour pool for the plan-
tation economy.
() The ‘ﬁfty niners’, Tutsi refugees who ﬂed Rwanda because of events in Rwanda
between  and .
() Hutu refugees who ﬂed Rwanda in the aftermath of the  genocide.
Throughout Congolese history the citizenship status of Rwandophones has been contested.
The date of arrival has been important to establish legal citizenship in Congo. During the
transition to independence, the right of ‘Banyarwanda immigrants’ was not solved. Only
in –was a law passed that clearly stated that those who ‘had at least one ancestor mem-
ber of a tribe or part of a tribe established on Congolese territory before ’, were consid-
ered of Congolese nationality. The law of  March  deﬁned citizenship as: ‘The
people originating from Ruanda-Urundi established in Congo on the date of June  
have acquired the Congolese nationality on said date.’ Barely a year later, in  this
law was slightly altered: Congolese nationality was again conferred to those belonging to a
corporate ‘Congolese ethnicity’. Nevertheless, those from Ruanda-Urundi living in Congo
on January   were still eligible for Congolese nationality. In  the law granting
Congolese nationality to people from Ruanda-Urundi was again revoked, and pushed the
date to which an ethnic community had to be established in Congo back to .
The current law gives Congolese nationality to all those individuals belonging to ethnic
groups whose people and territory constituted the Congo in . The law does not
 Willame, ‘Banyarwanda’; R. Lemarchand, ‘Exclusion’; D. Newbury, ‘Returning refugees: four historical
patterns of “coming home” to Rwanda’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, : (), –.
 C. Malengana, Nationalité et citoyenneté au Congo-Kinshasa: le cas du Kivu (Paris, ), , .
 Ibid. . For a schematic overview, see J. Stearns, North Kivu: The Background to Conﬂict in North Kivu
Province of Eastern Congo (London, ), ; and for an elaborate discussion, see S. Jackson, ‘Of
“doubtful nationality”: political manipulation of citizenship in the DR Congo’, Citizenship Studies, :
(), –.
 Malengana, Nationalité, .
 Ibid. ; G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘The politics of citizenship in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in
S. R. Dorman, P. Nugent, and D. P. Hammett (eds.), Making Nations, Creating Strangers (Leiden, ),
; Jackson, ‘Of “doubtful”’, .
 Jackson, ‘Of “doubtful”’, ; Malengana, Nationalité, .
 Ibid.
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exclude all Kinyarwanda-speakers from access to citizenship. The ﬁrst and second group of
Kinyarwanda-speakers have, in theory, no problem claiming Congolese nationality.
However, the problem lies in its interpretation. Many people still believe that the cut-off
date for nationality should be the date of the Berlin Conference in  (as it was in the law
between  and ), or are not aware that the date has been changed. At the same time,
many Kinyarwanda-speakers, and especially Congolese Tutsi, do not feel reassured by the
current law because their citizenship is still often contested in local contexts and their citi-
zenship has been switched on and off opportunistically for political reasons in the past.
More problematic is the ambiguous language of the law, which vaguely deﬁnes ethnic
groups as having not only ‘people’, but also ‘territory’. In practice, being considered as
a ‘people’ with a ‘territory’ is often dependent on or equated with having had a ‘customary’
organization recognized by the colonial administration. Consequently, in North Kivu,
depending on the point of view and interpretation, this makes it easier to deny the second
wave of Kinyarwanda-speakers’ (those who arrived during the colonial period, and their
offspring) legitimate claims to nationality and thus citizenship. While between  and
 they had a chieftaincy of their own (the Banyarwanda-chefferie in Gishari, Masisi
highlands), this chieftaincy was abolished in , effectively blocking these second-wave
Kinyarwanda-speakers from access to land and political authority on the local level in
Masisi Territory.
To understand contemporary struggles around land and political power at the local level
in North Kivu, the creation of chieftaincies by the colonial administration is crucial.
Through the introduction of these chieftaincies, cultural communities with varying degrees
of political centralization and political coherence in what are nowadays the North and
South Kivu provinces were (re)organized into hierarchical and centralized political entities
in neatly deﬁned territories. This idea of mapping ‘culture’ and ‘political power’ in a
one-to-one relationship to a neatly deﬁned territory was then telescoped into the past to
give these re-invented political entities legitimacy. Most importantly, this ‘territorialisation
of identity’ that was a result of this administrative reorganization inﬂuenced and continues
to profoundly inﬂuence the access of these communities to the colonial and postcolonial
state.
The idea that cultural groups must coincide with a hierarchical and centralized political
organization which in turn is closely related to well-delineated territory became integrated
in the discursive framework of ‘autochthony’ and has inscribed itself in the discussion
about ‘who belongs where’. Denying an ‘autochthonous’ status based on whether certain
 Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘The politics’.
 Jackson, ‘Of “doubtful”’, .
 The ‘ﬁrst group’ of Kinyarwanda-speakers, those already settled in North Kivu long before the colonial period
have their own chefferie, the Bwisha chefferie (Rutshuru Territory), and have ‘customary’ Hutu chiefs at lower
levels of administration. Kinyarwanda-speakers not having legal access to land and ‘customary’ authority on
the local level is mainly a problem in Masisi (North Kivu) where Kinyarwanda-speakers are the majority but
do not have ‘customary’ representation.
 B. Muchukiwa, Territoires ethniques et territoires étatiques: pouvoirs locaux et conﬂits interethniques au
Sud-Kivu (RD Congo) (Paris, ); K. Vlassenroot, South Kivu: Identity, Territory, and Power in the
Eastern Congo (London, ).
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groups had certain forms of ‘customary’ organization under colonial rule became a factor
in political struggles and struggles over resources.
The language of ‘autochthony’, which juxtaposed an ‘autochthonous’ Congolese popu-
lation against those ‘coming from Rwanda’ (the migrants who came to Congo in the con-
text of the resettlement scheme for Rwandan labour), had already started in the s
among agents of the colonial administration. See, for example, an excerpt from a letter
of the Provincial Governor of Kivu in , which was a reaction to an article written
by a certain abbé Kajiga.
We must do everything to keep the indigenous authority on different levels in the hands of the
autochthones [sic], we cannot in any way encourage the study of Kinyarwanda and we must
favour the use of local languages and Swahili. In the schools the use of Kinyarwanda needs to
be constrained, the [?] need to be always in preference attributed to autochthones [sic], the immi-
gration and installation of new Watusi (Tutsi) coming from Rwanda should be avoided as much as
possible (autant que faire se peut), ﬁnally we must . . . monitor that the natives are mingled to the
maximum with the Rwandans already installed. . . .. I insist you make all agents who are interested
in the problem of the coexistence of the Banyarwanda and our population read and reﬂect on
Kajiga’s study so they realize (s’impregenent) the insidious dangers of this Rwandan irredentism
and so we develop with all the tact and caution necessary the attitude to defeat it.
Notwithstanding the different historical context of this citation (the reactions of the colo-
nial administration were shaped by fears concerning local conﬂicts and ‘Rwandan irreden-
tism’ rather than shaped by years of armed conﬂict involving Rwanda, directly or
indirectly), the gist of this discourse resembles present-day exclusionary discourses in
Congo. Particularly, the emphasis on the juxtaposition between so-called ‘autochthones’
and Rwandans, and the suspicions that Kinyarwanda-speakers – especially Tutsi – are
somehow prone to territorial expansion are simmering through. It is known that in
Francophone Africa the discourse of ‘autochthony’ had colonial roots, but it seems that
this was also the case in the Belgian colonial sphere. Similar discourses have often
been reiterated during and after the Congo wars, and are still heard today. Such percep-
tions were, in the past, but also more recently, possibly fuelled by historical narratives in
Rwanda of which we have seen examples above.
In sum, decisions by the colonial administration about how they chose to administer the
population are mobilized today to exclude Kinyarwanda-speakers (in the example below
the Banyamulenge) from citizenship. The absence of a ‘customary’ organization recognized
by the colonial authorities is simply equated with not having been there, and thus discredits
 For more general approach of this process, see M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and
the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, ).
 G. Kajiga, ‘Cette immigration séculaire des Ruandais au Congo’, Bulletin Trimestriel du Centre d’Etude des
Problèmes Sociaux Indigènes,  (), –.
 AAB GG/, Letter from the province Governor G. Schmidt to the district commissary of North Kivu, 
Nov. .
 More detail on the colonial period: Mathys, ‘People’, –.
 Governor Schmidt supposes Kajiga is Tutsi; see AAB GG/, Letter from the province. According to
Murairi Mutima though, Kajiga was Hutu. See J.-B. Murairi Mitima, Les Bahunde aux pieds des volcans
Virunga (Paris, ), .
 Ceuppens and Geschiere, ‘Autochthony’, –.
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claims to Congolese citizenship and the rights that go with it for these people. This excerpt
from a declaration of the Mai-Mai of Fizi in the context of the  Goma Peace
Conference is quite telling in this regard:
They [the Banyamulenge] say they have arrived in Congo two centuries ago, this is not true, it is
common knowledge (notoriété publique) that the Belgian colonizers organized Groupements
according to the different ethnic and cultural groups. For example, the Basikasingu living in Fizi
Territory because they did not share the same culture as the Babembe had their own
Groupement in the Lulenge sector . . . If they [the Banyamulenge] were there, how could the
Belgians have forgotten them? All the chiefs of the Groupements received palata (royal insignia).
If they are Congolese, let them show one.
Nevertheless, even having had a ‘customary’ authority recognized by the Belgian colonial
administration is not a guarantee. Different perceptions of the group of Kinyarwanda-
speakers in Rutshuru Territory show again how ‘slippery’ this category of ‘autochthony’
really is. During the colonial era, this group was granted its own chieftaincy led by a
Hutu mwami. For many, these people (sometimes also called Banyabwisha) are consid-
ered ‘autochthonous’ Congolese.Others still try to cast doubt on the ‘autochthony’ of the
Kinyarwanda-speakers living in this Bwisha chefferie, framing them as migrants arriving
after the delineation of the colonial borders. Often, such narratives on autochthony
also divulge a rather positivistic preoccupation with historical ‘hard proof’ and ‘docu-
ments’, preferably originating in the colonial past. The reference to the palata above is a
case in point, but there are also other examples.
The ‘guerre Kanyarwanda’ (–), is the ﬁrst time that ‘autochthons’ openly and
violently clashed with Rwandophones, and especially those of the second wave (the
immigrés) in Masisi, Rutshuru, and Walikale (North Kivu). While this war emerged
in the context of the discussion of provincial administrative boundaries in Kivu, it
was also about access to power on the local and provincial level. It is said that during
this war one of the ﬁrst moves of the Hunde was to burn the archives of the population
registers of all administrative localities. This enabled them to qualify all
Kinyarwanda-speakers as ‘strangers’ or ‘refugees’. In later periods, the use of colonial
 The Goma Peace Conference was held in Goma in January  and reunited over twenty armed groups in
negotiations with the government.
 Mwenebatu Assanda Joseph, ‘Déclaration des Mai-Mai de Fizi à la conférence sur la paix, la sécurité et le
développement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu Tenue à Goma en Janvier ’, emphasis
added. Thanks to Judith Verweijen for this document. The palata was the sign the chefs médaillés carried.
For a very short time, Banyamulenge had a ‘customary’ organisation. See K. Vlassenroot, South Kivu:
Identity, Territory, and Power in the Eastern Congo (London, ), –.
 It is possible that Banyabwisha – in analogy with Banyamulenge – was chosen to stress differences with groups
of Kinyarwanda-speakers who arrived later. On the genesis of the term Banyamulenge, see Lemarchand,
‘Exclusion’, –.
 See, for example, J. Mpisi, Le Kivu pour la paix!: Les actes de la conférence de Goma (janvier ) (Paris,
), .
 L. K. Muhindo, Après les Banyamulenge, voici les Banyabwisha aux Kivu (Kinshasa, ). A similar vision is
present in M. G. Mahano, Existe-t-il des rwandais congolais? (Kinshasa, ), –.
 Lemarchand, Dynamics, ; B. Mararo, ‘Land, power, and ethnic conﬂict in Masisi (Congo-Kinshasa),
s–’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, : (), .
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ethnographic maps to ‘prove’ that there were no Kinyarwanda-speakers in Kivu before
 is another striking example.
Thus, the ‘colonial toolbox’ has been an important building block in constructing
Rwandophones as non-autochthones. The ‘guerre Kanyarwanda’ (and the wars between
– that are not addressed here) are examples of how autochthony discourses could
contribute to violence, even when not directly causing it. These ﬁrst rounds of localized vio-
lence foreshadowed the more widespread and massive outbursts of violence that would be
triggered by Rwandan invasions from  onwards, and which are discussed in the
remainder of this article.
COLLECTIVE MEMORIES AND THE POLITICS OF VICTIMHOOD
Autochthony discourses not only juxtapose who is in and who is out, they also often pos-
ition ‘victims’ against ‘aggressors’. Therefore, victimization discourses can be used to legit-
imize the use of violence, framing it as a form of self-defence. Such narratives of
victimization often make strong historical references. It is not uncommon to see ‘memories’
and ‘countermemories’ justifying atrocities or ‘pre-emptive’ attacks that are legitimized
based on historical wrongdoings.
The Bunyungu royal family is the lakeside branch of one of the Hunde royal families in
Congo. One of the historical songs sung at the Bunyungu Court relates how a Rwandan
mwami decapitated a member of the Bunyungu royal family. According to the song, the
decapitated nobleman rebelled against the Rwandan mwami. After the latter had thrown
the nobleman’s head into Lake Kivu, it crossed Lake Kivu while singing, and went ashore
somewhere between Sake and Minova. According to the memories attached to the story
about this head, at the place where it went ashore, there is now a gigantic ﬁcus tree, which
remains untouched to this day. After a performance of the song, almost all the men pre-
sent were visibly touched. When asked why, they said that it was because one of their own
was killed by another mwami from a neighbouring country, and that it tells the history of
their people facing hardship caused by a neighbouring state.
Their response to the song shows that history is very much alive in this region. Oral tra-
ditions do make mention of a Hunde prince having been killed by a Rwandan mwami,
although it seems to be unclear who exactly. While it would be tempting to see this as
 Jackson, ‘Sons’, n.
 K. C. Dunn, ‘“Sons of the soil” and contemporary state making: autochthony, uncertainty and political
violence in Africa’, Third World Quarterly, : (), –.
 M. Boas and K. Dunn, Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conﬂict (London, ).
 See also, interview with Bernard, Monigi,  Feb. ; Interview with Jean-Bosco, Bulengo,  Sept. .
Referenced in Murairi Mitima, Les Bahunde, –. I was told the name of the song is lwimbo lwa malira
(the song of tears). Malira signiﬁes ‘tears’ or ‘crying’, and is given as a name to newborns after the death
of an important person. See Murairi Mitima, Parlons Kihunde (Paris, ), .
 I recorded the song on  Oct. . A copy of this recording was given to those who performed it.
 The fact that the ‘tree’ and the ‘head’ are associated in historical memory does not necessarily mean that they
have the same origin. The link between the tree and the story about the head could be iconatrophic, or could
have been made later.
 Group discussion, Bweremana,  Oct. .
 P. Schumacher, Die physiche und sociale Umwelt der Kivu-Pygmäen (Brussels, ), .
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just a historical tale, the image of a beheaded victim seeking revenge is also a ‘core cliché’ of
various oral epics in the region. In this case however, the story was reinterpreted against
the backdrop of Rwandan ‘aggression’ since . In the context of the consecutive wars
mentioned in the introduction, many atrocities and human rights violations were commit-
ted by Rwandan and Rwandan-backed forces, but also by others, between  and
. It is in this sense that the song can also be considered to be playing a role in
the construction of Hunde, and by extension, Congolese victimhood at the hand of
Rwanda.
In a similar vein, there seems to be a historical trope linked to the alleged cruelty of
Rwabugiri speciﬁcally, or Rwandan bami in general. One of the men present during the
performance of the song had spoken before on the topic of Rwabugiri: ‘They said he
was a colonizer, even while drinking beer, he drank it sitting on the knees of others. He
tortured people, instead of putting his staff in the ground, he put it in a foot.’
‘Collective memories’ of precolonial ‘Rwandan’ wrongdoings are not limited to the
example above. I collected historical narratives about Rwabugiri among other groups as
well, and it seems that all the lakeside people share such memories. However, although
these collective memories are based on actual historical events – Rwabugiri’s campaigns
affected most lakeside communities and Idjwi – it is difﬁcult to discern in how far these col-
lective memories have been inﬂuenced by more recent events (such as the Rwandan inva-
sions mentioned above); the instrumentalization of such narratives by politicians; and the
inﬂuence of discourses circulating in the run-up to and during the  genocide (see
below). The statement on Rwabugiri above, for example, echoes this tract circulating
in Bukavu around October :
People of South Kivu, following the barbarous crimes committed in Kavumu, Makobola, Burhinyi,
Mwenga and Bunyakiri, massacres against our peaceful population of Bukavu are already being
prepared by Kagame, Museveni and Buyoya . . . History does not contradict us. The terrible atro-
cities committed shortly before the beginning of the th century by the Tutsi kings prove sufﬁ-
ciently to what extent you are descended from Cain. Just imagine: A Tutsi king, every time he
wanted to stand up, had to lean on a spear that was plunged into the leg of a Hutu subject.
The point was very sharp and covered with poison. What cruelty!
In this tract, suffering is given more time-depth by referring to a distant past, while the dis-
tant past is used as a warning for what might come.
Apart from this discursive strategy, it is possible that the discourses evolving in Rwanda
between  and  also had an impact on collective memories and on discourses
 Personal communication with David Newbury.
 For the most complete overview, see UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, –, Report of the Mapping Exercise (Aug. ).
 Group discussion,  Oct. , Bweremana.
 In North and South Kivu. See also, International Alert, Les mots qui tuent: rumeurs, préjugés, stéréotypes et
mythes parmi les peuples des pays des Grands Lacs d’Afrique (International Alert: ).
 On Rwabugiri’s campaigns, see D. Newbury, ‘Les campagnes de Rwabugiri: chronologie et bibliographie’,
Cahiers d’études africaines, : (), –.
 Anonymous tract written by COPACO (Collective of Congolese Patriots), dated  Feb. , cited in Stearns,
Dancing, .
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circulating within the Congolese context. The song Bene Sebahinzi, by notorious musician
Simon Bikindi, and one of the songs regularly returning on Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLM)’s playlist, narrates the suffering of the Hutu population at the
hand of the (Tutsi) monarchy. It sings the histories of conquest under the (Tutsi) monarchy
and the extermination and defeat of small-scale polities and their kings in western Rwanda.
The song also reminded the audience of the cruelty of the monarchy by telling how Kalinga
(the royal drum), was decorated with the genitals of those defeated kings. While Bene
Sebahinzi was more than once the soundtrack of killing-sprees during the genocide in
, this trope of royal cruelty was repeated during RTLM’s emissions, and was also
reproduced through other media such as Kangura, one of the newspapers stoking virulent
hatred against the Tutsi and politically-moderate Hutu in the run-up to the genocide.
Calls to violence rousing the Rwandan Hutu population against the Tutsi were in .
per cent accompanied by allegations that the RPA were not Rwandan and part of a con-
spiracy to establish a Hima-Tutsi-monarchy in the region, while . per cent of the state-
ments referred to the cruelty of the monarchy (but also armed insurgencies in the s).
Kangura addressed audiences that went beyond Rwanda, and also tried to reach out to
Hutu in the eastern Congo, as in Kangura  () with the Appel à la conscience des
Bahutu (see also below), while RTLM sometimes also referred to Tutsi inﬁltrating from
Congo (then Zaïre).
It is difﬁcult to unravel how speciﬁc narratives have travelled within the region around
Lake Kivu. Moreover, certain tropes and clichés are probably part of a deeper cultural lexi-
con shared by different groups within this region, but have been given new meanings in the
pre-genocidal context in Rwanda, and as result of the wars in Congo since . Thus,
narratives about the cruelty of Rwabugiri (or other ‘Rwandan’ kings) were already part
of ‘collective memory’ among different groups at the western shores of Lake Kivu, but
they no longer bear the same meanings as they did in the past – and even in the past
their meanings were not ﬁxed. In turn, these discourses have been used to legitimize vio-
lence against Congolese Tutsi.
TERRITORY AND THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF VICTIMHOOD
The imagery associated with the Hamitic hypothesis mentioned above is one discourse
through which Congolese Tutsi became framed as ‘outsiders’. The ‘colonial toolbox’
 G. Mbonimana and J. D. D. Karangwa, ‘Topical analysis of the songs Twasezereye: We bade farewell; Nanga
abahutu or Akabyutso: I hate the Hutu or The Awakening; and Bene Sebahinzi or Intabaza: the descendants of
Sebahinzi or The Alert by Simon Bikindi’, Expert Report Prepared for ICTR---/ (Arusha, ).
 Transcript of RTLM’s emission of  Apr. , journalist Georges Ruggiu, RTLM/, (http://www.
rwandaﬁle.com/rtlm/pdf/rtlm.pdf). On collective memories on the cruelty of the monarchy among
convicted Hutu in prison, see E. Jessee and S. Watkins, ‘Good kings, bloody tyrants, and everything in
between: representations of the monarchy in post-genocide Rwanda’, History in Africa,  (), .
 L. Kirschke, Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda
– (London, ), –.
 J.-P. Chrétien, ‘“Presse libre” et propagande raciste au Rwanda: Kangura et “les  commandements du
Hutu”’, Politique africaine,  (), . Transcript of RTLM’s emission of  Apr. , journalist
Kantano Habimana, RTLM/, (http://www.rwandaﬁle.com/rtlm/pdf/rtlm.pdf).
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also played an important role. But politics, and especially their role during the Congo Wars
(–/–) and in the CNDP and M rebellions, have also shaped the conﬂ-
ation of Congolese Tutsi with all Tutsi, and of Congolese Kinyarwanda-speakers with
Rwanda in the eyes of many other Congolese.
Above we saw that the rights to Congolese nationality for Rwandophones has been
‘switched on and off’ whenever political leaders – and especially Mobutu – felt that playing
out ‘ethnicities’ against each other would suit them. In South Kivu, the changes in the
 nationality law (which put the cut-off date at ) had barred Banyamulenge from
participating in the elections in  and , as their adversaries argued that they had
arrived only after the establishment of the Congo Free State in . This furthered already
existing tensions between the Banyamulenge and other communities in South Kivu.
At the beginning of the s, the transition to multi-partyism led to ﬁerce competition
between political elites in South Kivu. One member of these political elites, the vice-
president of the National Assembly and member of the Bembe community, Anzuluni,
was the instigator of several anti-Banyamulenge campaigns. The arrival of refugees from
Burundi and Rwanda ﬂeeing (anticipated) massacres in – only increased these ten-
sions. Anzuluni increasingly used an anti-Banyamulenge rhetoric in public, which led to
widespread harassment of the Banyamulenge. Speeches such as these bolstered already
existing anti-Tutsi sentiments, identiﬁed Banyamulenge as the enemy, and portrayed (pro-
active) self-defence as legitimate.
Meanwhile, the recruitment of many Banyamulenge by the RPF, who had started
their campaign against Kigali in the early s, reiterated the identiﬁcation of the
Banyamulenge with Rwandan Tutsi. In the summer of , this led to growing anti-
Tutsi sentiments when these early recruits started to return to South Kivu, and tit-for-tat
killings between the Banyamulenge and other communities became common currency,
while cross-border tensions also began to mount.
In North Kivu as well, at least from the beginning of the s, many Tutsi joined ﬁrst
the RPF, and later the AFDL. They were motivated by multiple factors, among them the
shaky status of their citizenship, the deterioration of relationships between Congolese
Tutsi and other communities, and intercommunal violence between  and .
The armed force invading Congo in October , ofﬁcially starting the First Congo
war, was heavily dominated by Rwandan Tutsi, but also by Banyamulenge and
Congolese Tutsi. This reinforced the identiﬁcation between ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Rwanda’.
 Jackson, ‘Of “doubtful”’; Lemarchand, Dynamics, –.
 Jackson, ‘Of “doubtful”’, .
 David Newbury dates their arrival to the late eighteenth century; see Newbury, ‘Irredentism’, ; J. Verweijen
and K. Vlassenroot, ‘Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authority: the contested
territorial aspirations of the Banyamulenge in the Eastern DR Congo’, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, : (), .
 Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed’, ; Stearns, Dancing, –.
 Stearns, Dancing, –.
 Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed’, .
 See Stearns, Dancing; more details in P. Mathieu and J. C. Willame (eds.), ‘Conﬂits et guerres au Kivu et dans
la région des Grands Lacs’, Cahiers Africains (), –.
 Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed’, .
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In North Kivu, the violence of – and threats posed by the armed gangs hiding
among Rwandan Hutu refugees had already led to the emergence of local militia.
Yet, it was the invasion of the AFDL that led to the mushrooming in rural areas in
North and South Kivu of armed groups operating under the label of Mai-Mai. The shared
language of these Mai-Mai groups was ‘autochthony’ and local defence against the
‘Rwandan’ invaders. The ﬁckleness of the political alliances of theseMai-Mai groupings
is legendary, and opportunistic motives often trumped ideological ones when it came to
those with and against whom they fought. Nevertheless, these Mai-Mai, at several stages
supported by Kinshasa, mounted local resistance against the Rwandan invaders, or against
those armed groups backed by Rwanda.
This was the case for resistance against the RCD (–), already mentioned
above, but also for those groups that emerged after the end of the Second War (–
), and that had roots in the previous movements, such as the CNDP (–) and
M (–). The latter movements are generally considered as ‘Tutsi’, although they
were not supported by all Congolese Tutsi. They thrived on a mixture of grassroots grie-
vances, while also being used by military and political elites for political and economic
objectives, and proﬁting from state weakness.
In  and  the M was one of the most powerful armed movements in the east-
ern Congo. They violently clashed several times with the Forces Armées de la
République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), causing massive population displace-
ments. In November  they managed to take Goma. It is thus no surprise that they
attracted the most international attention, appeared most in ofﬁcial discourses of the
Congolese government, and were most present in popular discourses in the urban centres
of Goma and Bukavu. Moreover, the Rwandan backing of M rekindled simmering
tensions between Rwanda and Congo.
Often, in ofﬁcial discourses – as was the case for its predecessor the CNDP – M was
framed as an extension of Rwandan military, political, and economic interests, and seces-
sionist tendencies were imputed to M and by extension to Rwanda. Richard Muyej, then
Congolese Minister of the Interior was quoted in September : ‘M is another name
for Rwanda. It’s all part of Rwanda’s Machiavellian destabilisation plan of the east.’
Muyej’s quote is yet another example of a belief of sustained Rwandan involvement
in Kivu, which is also widespread among the urban population of Goma, Bukavu, and
 J. Stearns, North Kivu, –.
 Verweijen and Vlassenroot, ‘Armed’, .
 J. Stearns, ‘Causality and conﬂict: tracing the origins of armed groups in the Eastern Congo’, Peacebuilding,
: (), . See also, Stearns, North Kivu, –.
 Especially for M. Stearns, From, . For motives, see Stearns, ‘Causality’. For appreciation among
Congolese Tutsi, see A. F. Umutoni, ‘“Where do we belong?” Identity and autochthony discourse among
Rwandophones Congolese’, African Identities, : (), –.
 C. Vogel, ‘Mapping: the landscape of armed groups in the DRC’, Dec. , (http://christophvogel.net/
mapping/).
 Informal conversations, own observations Nov. , July/Aug. .
 See K. Manson, ‘Rwanda’s proxy forces muddy Congo conﬂict’, Financial Times,  Sept. , (http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s//e--e-aa-feabdc.html#axzzBWklCLU).
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its hinterland. At the same time, now as much as in the past, narratives such as these
have been central to propping the Congolese government’s legitimacy in the light of
increasing criticism from the population on the government’s impotence to provide a
basic sense of security.
In many cases, popular narratives were (and are) not limited to commenting solely on
Rwanda’s economic and political interests, but were also seen as ‘territorial’ in nature: as a
threat to the DRC’s sovereignty. The territorial aspirations assigned to Rwanda were framed
in a wider context of presumed conspiracies aiming for the ‘balkanization’ of the DRC. In
these ‘balkanization’ theories, Rwanda is sometimes seen as an agent or collaborator of
‘the west’, which is perceived as solely interested in plundering the riches of the Congo.
Allegations of Rwanda exploiting Congolese resources are not wholly unfounded, as the
exploitation of Congo’s resources during the Second Congo War was organized by Kigali’s
Congo Desk.
When Goma was taken by M in November , people in Bukavu compared Kabila to
Gorbachev. In doing so they referred to Gorbachev’s introduction of glasnost and perestroika
that ultimately led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Others referred to supposed plans
by Rwanda to erect a République des Volcans, a kind of independent Kivu led by Rwanda,
which would give Rwanda access to Kivu’s resources. In May , an op-ed titled ‘Tutsi,
return home’ appeared in Kinshasa’s most popular newspaper Le Potentiel:
AFDL in , RCD in , UPC in , CNDP in , M in  . . . all these bloody
episodes have in common the protection of the Congolese Tutsi community – a community trans-
planted from Rwanda to Congo by Belgium during the colonial period. . . . The deduction thus
made keeps the following logic: The Tutsi community, at least its elite, has never been ready for
integration. This supports the thesis of the search for a Tutsiland which would be transplanted
unto, it speaks for itself, Kivu. . . . The Kivus, wounded in the ﬂesh by the transplantation of a
Tutsiland, feel entitled to recuperate by every means their territory.
Discourses about a ‘Tutsi-land’ or about alleged Rwandan (or often ‘Tutsi’) plans to colonize
Kivu were not new during the M crisis. During the war in Masisi in – Kinshasa
newspapers referred to plans for the establishment of a ‘Republic of the Great Lakes’.
 On Rwandan involvement in M, see United Nations Group of Experts (UN GoE), S//, Final
report of the GoE on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph  of Security Council Resolution
, , and UN GoE, S//, Midterm report of the GoE on the DRC submitted in accordance
with paragraph  of Security Council Resolution , .
 M. Doevenspeck, ‘Constructing the border from below: narratives from the Congolese–Rwandan state
boundary’, Political Geography, : (), .
 L. C. Heuning, No Mistaken Identity: Kinshasa’s Press and the ‘Rwandophone’ Other (Zürich, ), ,
.
 Lemarchand, Dynamics, . For more examples, see UN GoE, S//, Report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC, .
 Personal observations, Bukavu, Nov. . For references to this discourse, see Murairi Mitima, Les
Bahunde, .
 D. M. Onakaya, ‘Tutsi rentrez chez vous’, Le Potentiel,  May , (http://www.courrierinternational.
com/article////tutsis-rentrez-chez-vous). For more examples of the balkanization reference frame
in Kinshasa’s newspapers, see L.-C. Huening, ‘Making use of the past: the Rwandophone question and
the “Balkanisation of the Congo”’, Review of African Political Economy, : (), –.
 Heuning, No Mistaken, .
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These discourses also seem to have cross-border connections, as they (re)appeared in the
context of the war in Rwanda that began with the attack of the RPF on the north of
Rwanda in , possibly reinforcing, or reinforced by, discourses across the border. In
December , Kangura, one of the media outlets stoking hate against Tutsi in the
run-up to the genocide, published a piece aimed at ‘Bahutu who are abroad’ that alluded
to ‘a Tutsi plan’ to colonize Kivu. The plan would have been ‘discovered’ in North Kivu in
 (in the context of the ‘guerre Kanyarwanda’), but is possibly a fabrication, dating
back to the s.
These discourses about ‘Rwandan’ or ‘Tutsi’ plans to ‘colonize’ Kivu are also projected
back in time. In the eastern DRC, Rwabugiri’s campaigns are used to provide ‘proof’ of the
presumed inherent and primordial war-mongering and irredentist nature of Rwandans
(and especially Tutsi), especially in the DRC. This is, ironically, a cynical reversal of the
argument that equates Rwabugiri’s ephemeral occupation with actual annexation in
Rwanda (see above), and might possibly also be inﬂuenced by discourses on a ‘greater
Rwanda’. One of the most telling examples is a passage in the report of the  national
‘Vangu-commission’, a commission established in the wake of the ‘Resolution on nation-
ality’ that denied Congolese citizenship to all Rwandan immigrants. The report explained
the causes of destabilization in North and South Kivu as follows:
Towards the end of the th century, a Rwandan King Rwabugiri tried several times to attack
Buhavu, Bushi and Buhunde. His attempts resulted in his death on the Kivu Lake in a Havu
ambuscade in . This information is very important to understand the nostalgic attitudes of
the Rwandan Hutu or Tutsi who believed that a launched but failed attack (montée et
manquée) creates a motive for territorial claims, and hope to relaunch the military expeditions
against the geographical region of the Bahavu, Bashi and Bahunde . . . .
Similarly, a tract from the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS),
(one of the biggest Mai-Mai groups in North Kivu), written in  by a team of self-
proclaimed ‘patriotic Congolese researchers’ at the height of M activity states:
Since its existence on earth, the Hunde population has been the victim of humiliation, frustration,
discrimination and attempts at extermination, the consequences of repeated aggression of external
forces on Congolese territory and especially Hunde territory. In origin, it is always Rwanda of
which their intention is to conquer Kivu. . . . In fact, before the partition of Africa in , the
old Bami (Tutsi Rugangu) [sic] of Rwanda often tried to expand their kingdom through incursions
in some parts of the Hunde kingdom.
Perhaps statements uttered by the notorious Congolese CNDP rebel leader Laurent
Nkunda may have also reinforced this idea. In  Nkunda allegedly stated:
Rwanda is a neighbouring country of mine, of which the national language, the culture and the
ethnic composition are identical to my collectivité-chefferie of origin, Bwisha. With this country
 Chrétien, ‘Presse’, .
 ‘Vangu report’ or Haut Conseil de la Republique – Parlement de Transition (HCR-PT), ‘Rapport de la
commission d’information du HCR-PT sur la situation au Nord et Sud Kivu du  avril ’, Annex to
A. Guichaoua (ed.), Exilés, réfugiés, déplacés en Afrique centrale et Orientale (Paris, ), .
 Janvier Buingo Karairi and anonymous researchers, ‘Que sais-je de ces guerres à répétition à l’est de la RD
Congo!’ (). Digital copy in my possession thanks to Alexis Bouvy.
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[Rwanda], as with Burundi, my country has shared a colonial past for  years . . . under the name
of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. If there had been no colonization, and thus no creation
in Africa of totally new and artiﬁcial territorial entities, it is sure there would be no Congo today.
But, there would still be Bwisha, transvulcanic province of the ancient Rwanda. In consequence,
the ‘Banyabwisha’ would not be Congolese, but Banyarwanda, exactly as before the
‘Anglo-German Belgian Convention of ’ relative to the eastern borders of the Belgian
Congo.
In other cases Laurent Nkunda also used ‘victimhood discourses’, very real Tutsi grie-
vances, to underpin and to legitimize his rebellion. The following excerpt from an interview
in  is exemplary:
Where I am at, I am not defending the Tutsi. I am pleading their cause. There is a Tutsi cause
which has never been defended in this Republic. There are people who do not know if they are
Congolese or Rwandese. For years, they have been navigating between Rwanda and Congo. No
Congolese ofﬁcial ever tried to weigh in on the situation. I tell myself we need to plead for
these people so they are not excluded from the Republic. I have had the bad luck to be Tutsi
like those people. Still, I am doing important work. I have convinced many other ofﬁcials, civil
and military – who are not from the Tutsi community – of the necessity of pleading their cause.
I have sensitized them about the work I am doing, which is not limited solely to defending the
Tutsi, but above all because they (ceux-ci) do not have an advocate (défenseur).
As the examples above indicated, ‘victimization discourses’ and mythico-histories often
overlap. Both mobilize a distinct historical component to reconﬁgure the present. Such dis-
courses reframe reality, in order to make certain actions seem more acceptable. By using
the past as a warning for the future, these discourses ‘whitewash’ violence by portraying
it as self-defence. ‘Autochthonous’ Congolese and Kinyarwanda-speakers – often also
Congolese – or ‘Congolese’ and ‘Rwandans’, are seemingly constructed as ‘natural’
enemies by telescoping hostility into a distant past.
While in the cases portrayed above, ‘victimhood’ discourses construct Congolese identity
and ‘autochthony’ as a shared experience of being aggressed by Rwanda, such discourses
are also used by other groups. The statements from Nkunda are a case in point, and in
Rwanda as well, partial ‘politics of victimhood’ legitimize rule.
 L. Nkunda, ‘Un mouvement authentiquement congolais’,  Jan. , (http://www.congoindependant.com/
article.php?articleid=).
 Published interview with Laurent Nkunda,  Sept. , (http://www.laconscience.com/Laurent-Nkunda-
Je-ne-protege-pas-les-Tutsi-Je-plaide-leur-cause-Il-y-a-une-cause-tutsie-qui-n-a.html). For similar sentiments,
see Nkunda’s speech in Nyamitaba,  Aug.  in Stearns, From, .
 On the naturalizing capacities of autochtony discourses, see J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, ‘Naturing the
nation: aliens, apocalypse, and the post-colonial state’, Social Identities, : (), –.
 For more examples, see International Alert, ‘Les Mots’.
 J. Burnet, ‘Whose genocide? Whose truth? Representations of victim and perpetrator in Rwanda’, in
A. L. Hinton and K. L. O’Neill (eds.), Genocide: Truth, Memory, and Representation (Durham, );
H. Hintjens, ‘Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda’, Ethnicities, : (), –; E. King, ‘Memory
controversies in post-genocide Rwanda: implications for peacebuilding’, Genocide Studies and Prevention,
: (), –.
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CONCLUSION
In , René Lemarchand wrote about the borderland this article is addressing:
‘Connecting the dots between past and present is nowhere more fraught than where history
is a violently contested terrain, where claims to citizenship are heavily determined by ideo-
logical constructions, and the tendrils of violence rooted in long ago events.’ This article
has demonstrated that the past and its interpretations inﬂuence the present, and the present
profoundly inﬂuences representations of the past. In trying to ‘connect the dots’ between
past and present, one risks seeing the past as a function of the present which carries the
peril of ‘naturalizing’ contemporary antagonisms.
In a sense, history seems to be all but dead in this region. When it comes to oral history,
the rule of thumb is that oral histories say more about the social present than they say
about the past they are supposed to refer to. In this case, it seems that both the region’s
recent past and its present-day context has made it extremely difﬁcult to use oral history.
The past and its representations have been constantly manipulated to cater to political
needs. While this is in part a continuation of older patterns – both the Hamitic hypothesis,
and the manipulation of ethnic identities in Rwanda are exemplary – the cataclysmic events
in both Rwanda and Congo, have only enlarged the gap between partial and politicized
historical discourse and careful historical analysis.
The answer is not to eschew historical research or oral history, but rather, I would argue,
the opposite. We should ‘bring history back in’ and pay more attention to the way ‘identities’
and ‘territories’ acquired the meanings they have today, as they are both products of history.
Historical narratives also have a history, and are the result of historical processes shaping
these narratives, as much as these narratives have and are shaping historical processes.
Therefore, it is not enough to only study them in the context in which they emerge. They
are multi-layered, and even if they often refer to a shared cultural or historical lexicon, similar
discourses might have entirely different meanings in different historical contexts.
Consequently, more attention on the historical trajectories that shape these narratives is
necessary. Ignoring contingency in the production of not only ‘territories’ and ‘identities’
but also the discourses underlying these risks reproducing a politicized social present and ‘nat-
uralizing’ differences and antagonisms by giving them more time-depth. This is a danger not
only for insiders, but also for outsiders looking in – academics as much as interveners.
In , only a few years after the genocide in Rwanda and amid the Great Lakes’
regional crisis, the late Jan Vansina wrote that when historiographies are hard to ﬁnd, peo-
ple easily resort to what is available or circulating freely. Often, such work is biased and/or
lacks rigorous historical analysis and reliability. He argued that to prevent such distorted
and politicized accounts, historical research of both the recent and more distant past is
necessary, and called for histories going beyond the dominant and politicized frameworks
of interpretation. Today this is even truer than it was two decades ago. Let’s bring his-
tory back in.
 R. Lemarchand, ‘Recent historiography of Eastern Congo’, The Journal of African History, : (),
.
 J. Vansina, ‘The politics of history and the crisis in the Great Lakes’, Africa Today, : (), –.
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